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CONCEPT DECOMPOSITION
WALTER A. SEDELOW, JR.
Department of Computer Science

University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Little Rock, AR 72204
ABSTRACT

—

as with, e.g.,
Historically, perhaps the most general paradigm for scientists has been decomposition
'elements' inchemistry, and the basic structures/processes of theoretical physics. Knowledge representation research is encouraging a somewhat comparable activity incomputer science, by way of the study
of knowledge representation structures and knowledge repesentation systems. Symbol sets, rules of
usage (including divergent inferencing engines) and conceptual primitives are among the entities involved in this process of decomposition.
Years of association with research in the history of science have
eventuated ina conspectual overview of the character of science at large
including conand in a perceived sense of science's Grand Design
cept decomposition as well as other distinctive properties (Sedelow &
Sedelow, 1978; 1979). Despite traditional associations for the term
design, that Grand Design is not an individual invention, but, rather
a 'social invention' (Ogburn and Thomas, 1922). Itis not the work of
any one individual, nor even inits entirety the fully conscious plan of
a set of such, but, rather, the only partially intended, accreted result
of a process Koestler (1959) spoke of tropically as in some respects even
sonambulistic. To a computer scientist, inthat perspective science itself
may be 'ultimately' decomposable into the behavior of a Turing Machine
(Sedelow, 1980), or a Bavel Power Tier Automation (Bavel, 1988). Thus,
although conventionally there is an ascription ofconscious intent, much
of the detail of science, both in the large and in fine, does not require
a positing ofconsciousness (Gregory, 1987) and ofdeliberate intent to
account for patterns we find/invent inthe output of the scientific enterprise; some indication of that approach is to be found inthe published
papers already cited on the formalization of historiography and the
analysis of science as discourse, especially withreference to the highest
level in the scientificity hierarchy.
Aside from the major scientific achievements in China inearlier centuries (Needham, 1954) as well as the notable achievements of early
Islamic science, and taking science as at least predominantly an
and in the longer perspective of worldhistory
Occidental enterprise
itdoes seem apperhaps the Occident's primary accomplishment
parent that the most general scientific paradigm (inKuhn's, 1970, earlier
view of the role of paradigms) has been decomposition. That emphasis
on decomposition in the Grand Design of science is evident both by
way of the examination of the history of the individual sciences and
also by way of the study of the contrastive possibility of an emphasis
on systemic understanding.
Efforts to enhance the intellectual and technical power of computer
science as an academic discipline (Sedelow, 1989) encounter numerous
adamantine obstacles, many of them consequences of the pay-off matrix
in computer applications
which is so loaded as to reward short-term,
purely technique, trivia at the expense of scientific depth. Even in a
computer science specialty so necessarily concerned with 'ideas' as
expert systems, and artificial intelligence, that scientifically disadvantages condition has obtained. Nonetheless there are those like John
McCarthy who, while indubitably making shorter-term 'practical' contributions (e.g., the language LISP), have persisted in an effort to achieve
such generality of results (e.g., on the predicate calculus, as presented
in his Turing Lecture, 1987) as contribute to that cumulativeness crucial
to the growth of science.
Inthe domain of human language computing, and more specifically
expert systems, there is in the LittleRock division of the University
of Arkansas system an on-going effort whichhas been aided by grants
from The National Science Foundation, the Office of Naval Research,
the U.S. AirForce, and The Exxon Educational Research Foundation
to contribute to that depth of result which distinguishes science from
technology, as well as to accord withthat grand design inscience which
fosters decomposition. More specifically, and as also developed by S.
Sedelow (in press), some of that effort is directed to the study of whole
'natural' languages as knowledge representation structures employable
on the computer.
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Inthe aftermath of the consensual recognition of the non-productivity
of the General Problem Solver (GPS) of Simon, Newell, and Company
(on the Computer Science faculty at Carnegie-Mellon University), there
developed an enthusiasm for specific problem solvers highly engineered
to accommodate massive informational pump-priming, so that a
minimum of learning (contra Rosenblatt and Bloch's 'Perceptron') by
the computer-based system was required. Unfortunately for the development of computer science, and for the development of science
generally, a domain-specificity/generic-reasoning
contrast was not
problematicized, with the result that now more than a generation of
computer science students have been professionally enculturated with
the notion that in building cognitively robotic (Sedelow, 1988) or artificially intelligent systems one has to opt for domainal narrowness
in order to avoid a dead-end in an impoverished and barren abstractness. But now we can begin to see our way clear to attaining the
advantages of that breadth of scope sought by the builders of the General
Problem Solver at the same time that through modelling the semantic structure of a decomposed whole human language
we can engage
in the specific human language transforms which are at the core of
expert systems and numerous cognitive robotic applications (Marr,

—

1982).

At the moment the expert systems of AImight more accurately be
described as artificial idiots savants. While to build an artificial idiot
after all, an idiot savant
savant is a considerable accomplishment
specialized to playing chess is demonstrating considerable skill, no matter
what may be his/her limitations otherwise
nonetheless it does not
demonstrate that capacity for general-purpose symbol manipulation that
we speak of as a manifestation of at least verbal and logicomathematical
intelligence.
Inthe process of building expert systems numerous types of decomposition are employed, irrespective of whether the systems in question
are domain-narrow or domain-transcendent (Sedelow and Sedelow,
1988). Among the types of entities which knowledge representation
specialists examine are symbol sets (such as an alphabet or a number
system). There also is decomposition into rules of usage governing what
constitutes an acceptable string of items made up from a symbol set,
as well as decomposition into well-formed formulas, inferencing engines,
in the
etc. Itis now also possible to decompose the meaning space
sense of a mathematical space
created by a human language at any
given stage of its evolution. If, as intype-token mathematics, a distinction is made between types and tokens, the types as gathered together
for a language and then sorted alphabetically comprise a dictionary's
main entries.
The wordtypes used in the definitional components of that dictionary
could be regarded as a set of primitives (Sedelow and Sedelow, inpress).
Now if, one way or another
whether intrees, in semi-rings, or with
some other discrete mathematical structure (webs, for example), perhaps
not yet invented
an effort is made at least partially to order that
set of primitives, the result is a semantic space structure for the language
as a whole which also provides a basis for comparing one language with
another (Sedelow, 1988), even ifthose comparisons have to be made
withthe aid of a supra-binary (multi-valued) logic, such as rough sets
(Grzymala-Busse and Sedelow, 1988).
Many years of research stand behind the formalized symbolic processes (necesarily only glancingly) referred to here, and in Sally Yeates
Sedelow's paper in this Proceedings. Perhaps the best single introduc-
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tion to further knowledge of this work wouldbe by Sedelow and Sedelow
(1986); Sedelow and Sedelow (1987); and Sedelow and Sedelow (in
press).
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